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If Per Se Is Dying, Why Not in TV
Tying? A Case for Adopting the Rule of
Reason Standard in Television BlockBooking Arrangements
Nicole LaBletta*
“[W]e should not abdicate that role [under the Sherman Act] by
formulation of per se rules with no justification other than the
enhancement of predictability and the reduction of judicial
investigation. . . .” 1

INTRODUCTION
On July 2, 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act2 in response
to an industrial society that was prospering as a result of new
inventions.3 These inventions greatly contributed to the growth of
the new economy and to the growth of large trusts that had begun
to dominate that new economy.4 While the primary purpose of the
Sherman Act was to combat trusts,5 the language of the Act
extended to other types of arrangements that had the potential of
restraining trade.6 In fact, after the trust-busts in the oil and
* B.A., Classics, College of the Holy Cross, 1998; J.D., Fordham University School of
Law, 2001. I would like to dedicate this piece to my brother and my sister, and to thank
my mother for enabling me to reach this achievement.
1
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 622 (1972) (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
2
Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
1 (2001)).
3
See Violations of Antitrust Act of 1890: Hearing on H.R. Con. Res. 139, H.R. Con. Res.
29, and H.R. Con. Res. 813 Before the House Comm. on Rules, 62nd Cong. 4 (1911)
(statement of Rep. Augustus Stanley, Member, House Comm. on Rules).
4
See Howard L. Peck, The Sherman Antitrust Law From Its Legal and Economic
Standpoint: Is It Effective 1 (1912) (unpublished L.L.B. dissertation, Yale Law School)
(on file with Yale Law School).
5
Id. at 6.
6
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (providing that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust
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tobacco industries with which the Sherman Act is most often
associated,7 the Supreme Court had the opportunity to test the
breadth of Section 1 and found that it curbed intellectual property
rights.8
When enacting the Copyright Act of 1909,9 Congress had two
policies in mind: to provide an incentive to authors to reap the
fruits of their labor, and to facilitate public dissemination of those
works.10 Thus, a tension exists between encouraging inventions by
granting authors a copyright or patent monopoly while at the same
time ensuring that this monopoly does not restrain trade.11
Nowhere is this tension more visible than in a tying arrangement
involving intellectual property.12
Generally, a tying arrangement occurs where a party will sell
one product only if the buyer also purchases another product.13
Many of the tying cases involving intellectual property have been

or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”).
7
See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v.
Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
8
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912) (stating that
“[r]ights conferred by patents are indeed very definite and extensive, but they do not give
any more than other rights an [sic] universal license against positive prohibitions.”); see
also United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (declaring that
“the copyright laws, like the patent statutes, make reward to the owner a secondary
consideration.”).
9
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (repealed 1976).
10
H.R. Rep. No. 2222, at 7 (1909) (stating that “[t]he enactment of the copyright
legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural
right that the author has in his writings . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the
public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by
securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.”).
11
See WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW, A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
APPRAISAL 1 (1973); see also LAURENCE I. WOOD, PATENTS AND ANTIRTUST LAW 31
(1942).
12
See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 667 (1944) (quoting
Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912) (White, C.J., dissenting)) (stating that”[s]uch
a vast power to multiply monopolies at the will of the patentee would carve out
exceptions to the Antitrust laws which Congress has not sanctioned.”).
13
See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461 (1992)
(quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958)); Fields Prod. Inc. v.
United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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brought under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.14 Although cases
litigated under the Act during the Act’s first twenty years had the
misfortune of facing an interpretation that invalidated all restraints
of trade,15 in 1911 the Court adopted the rule of reason standard by
construing the language in Section 1 as forbidding only
unreasonable restraints.16
Under the rule of reason standard, courts balance all the
competitive harms and benefits of a particular business
arrangement before labeling it an unreasonable restraint of trade.17
However, once experience with a particular type of arrangement
enables a court to predict that the rule of reason would condemn it,
that arrangement is considered to be illegal per se under the
Sherman Act.18
The per se standard presumes that certain business arrangements
are illegal because of their pernicious effect on trade without
inquiry as to the arrangement’s harm or redeeming virtue.19
However, even if a court has typically categorized certain business
arrangements as per se violations of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act20, the inquiry often does not end there.21 The per se standard,
14

See, e.g., Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1940); Int’l
Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). Although this note focuses on cases
brought under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Section 3 of the Clayton Act also prohibits
tie-in sales that may substantially restrain trade. See 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1997).
15
See WOOD, supra note 11, at 28.
16
See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
17
See Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (explaining
that the reasonableness of a particular restraint involves consideration of the facts
peculiar to the business in which the restraint is applied, the nature of the restraint and its
effects, and the history of the restraint and the reasons for its adoption).
18
See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
19
See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
20
Id. (stating that “[a]mong the practices which the courts have heretofore deemed to be
unlawful in and of themselves are price fixing, division of markets, group boycotts, and
tying arrangements.”).
21
See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 18 (1983)(stating that
any inquiry must focus on whether distributors are selling “two separate products that
may be tied together, and if so, whether they have used their market power to force the
tying product”); Bd. of Regents v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 707 F.2d 1147, 1154
(10th Cir. 1983) (considering a least restrictive means test and business justification a per
se illegal price fixing arrangement); Todd J. Anlauf, Severing Ties With the Strained Per
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therefore, potentially enables courts to evaluate all business
arrangements with the same costs as the rule of reason standard.22
As a result, courts evaluating business arrangements that are
categorized as illegal per se have saved little time on the docket.
Moreover, relegating an arrangement to the per se category has
restricted market growth in areas where the particular arrangement
may not have caused an unreasonable restraint of trade.
Recognizing this Scylla and Charybdis of Section 1 analysis, the
Supreme Court recently released vertical price-fixing from the
chains of per se illegality in State Oil Co. v. Khan.23 Although
State Oil did not deal with tying arrangements involving
intellectual property, its holding reaffirms the Court’s recent
willingness to withdraw vertical arrangements from per se
illegality.24 Indeed, this landmark decision has already led to a call
for the rule of reason standard in block-booking, a tying
arrangement that has been just as entrenched in per se illegality as
vertical price-fixing had once been.25
Block-booking occurs when a distributor of visual programming
ties or licenses one feature or group of features on condition that
the exhibitor will also license another feature or group of features
released by the same distributor.26 This special tying arrangement
potentially violates Section 1 by forcing an exhibitor to accept
features the exhibitor would otherwise not choose, thereby denying
other exhibitors access to these features and depriving all
distributors of an opportunity to license their features to the
Se Test for Antitrust Tying Liability: The Economic and Legal Rationale For A Rule of
Reason, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 476, 491 (2000) (stating that even where the Supreme Court
deploys the strict per se rule, some business justifications have been entertained by the
court).
22
See Anlauf, supra note 21, at 491 (explaining that “[a] business justification factor
imputed into tying arrangement analysis may be closely analogous to the rule of reason
approaches adopted in other areas of antitrust law such as monopolization”) (quoting
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985)).
23
522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997).
24
Id. at 10 (explaining that the majority of commercial arrangements subject to the
antitrust laws are evaluated under the rule of reason standard).
25
See, e.g., United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Six W. Retail Acquisition
v. Sony Theatre Mgmt. Corp., No. 97 Civ. 5499, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2604, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2000).
26
See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156 (1948).
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coerced exhibitor.27 Although the Supreme Court began applying
the per se standard to tying arrangements outside of the context of
block-booking,28 the opportunity to extend this standard to blockbooking arrangements arose in United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc.29
Paramount Pictures, involving block-booking in the motion
picture industry,30 illustrates the Court’s attempt to prevent a
licensing practice in an industry dominated by five major movie
distributors who were accused of engaging in other anticompetitive behavior at that time.31 While the Court appreciated
the narrow scope of its holding,32 this case has been cited as a clear
declaration of block-booking’s illegality under the Sherman Act.33
Because the Supreme Court has extended the rule of reason
standard to various business arrangements in the name of free
enterprise,34 the Court should revisit the issue of block-booking in
light of the special circumstances of the television industry.
This note examines the current per se illegal status of blockbooking in the television industry. Although block-booking

27

See Fields Prod. Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
The majority of these cases involve patent law. See Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392 (1947); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940); see also N.
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (determining that it is unreasonable, per
se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market by tying arrangements);
Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949) (stating that
“[t]ying arrangements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition”).
29
334 U.S. 131 (1948).
30
See id. at 156.
31
See id. at 140-41.
32
Id. at 159 (stating that “[w]e do not suggest that films may not be sold in blocks or
groups, when there is no requirement, express or implied, for the purchase of more than
one film. All we hold to be illegal is a refusal to license one or more copyrights unless
another copyright is accepted.”).
33
See, e.g., United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 39 (1962);
Six W. Retail Acquisition v. Sony Theatre Mgmt. Corp., No. 97 Civ. 5499, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2604, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2000).
34
See, e.g., Cont’l Television, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977)
(overruling Schwinn and its per se invalidation of vertical restraints in the franchise
system); see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 31-32 (1984)
(holding that a particular tying arrangement, traditionally a per se violation, is not
inherently anti-competitive where the seller does not have market power).
28
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arrangements run the risk of unreasonably restraining trade,35 this
note argues that that risk is substantially lessened in the television
industry.
Part I of this note addresses the most recent case to evaluate a
block-booking arrangement in the television industry and examines
the general rationale behind per se illegality in block-booking
arrangements. Part I then presents other cases involving the bulk
licensing of intellectual property, to which the Court has refused to
attach per se illegality, as a model for how block-booking might
also be released from the per se category. Part II examines the
arguments both for and against continuing to evaluate blockbooking arrangements under the per se standard. Finally, Part III
argues that block-booking arrangements in the television industry
are not sufficiently anti-competitive to warrant a per se standard of
illegality. Part III concludes that relying on the rule of reason
standard to evaluate block-booking agreements would enhance
competition in the television industry.

I.
The stigma that results when courts relegate a business
arrangement to the per se category decreases the chance that such
an arrangement will be upheld, even if the arrangement did not
necessarily cause a restraint of trade. A recent example of how the
per se stigma stifled competition where a block-booking
arrangement would have enhanced competition occurred in MCA
Television Ltd. v. Public Interest Corp.36
Public Interest Corporation (PIC) was a Florida corporation that
owned and operated television station WTMV-TV in Lakeland,
Florida.37
MCA owned and licensed syndicated television
35

See, e.g., Pape Television Co. v. Associated Artists Prod. Corp., 277 F.2d 750, 752
(1960).
36
171 F.3d 1265, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999).
37
Id. at 1268.

FINAL.LAB

2001]

1/10/02 5:09 PM

IF PER SE IS DYING, WHY NOT IN TV TYING?

201

programs.38 PIC alleged that MCA’s conditioning its licensing of
several first-run television shows on the willingness of PIC to
license another first-run series called Harry and the Hendersons
(hereinafter “Harry”) constituted an illegal tying arrangement.39
PIC agreed to this arrangement, but it would not have chosen to
license Harry had it not been a condition to licensing the other
shows.40 When PIC fell behind on the cash portion of the Harry
contract, MCA sued PIC for breach of contract and copyright
infringement.41 PIC appealed the district court’s finding for MCA
and MCA cross-appealed the court’s determination that MCA’s
conditioning of the initial contracts on PIC’s licensing of Harry
constituted an antitrust violation in the form of block-booking.42
The Eleventh Circuit refused to remove the per se stigma in this
arrangement between an independent network and MCA, a
distributor and licensor of copyrighted features.43 MCA argued
that in State Oil Co. v. Khan,44 the Supreme Court overruled the
per se standard of illegality in the context of vertical maximum
price-fixing and provided dicta that would permit courts to
evaluate other vertical arrangements under the rule of reason
standard.45 However, the Eleventh Circuit halted that wave of
change by refusing to apply the rule of reason standard in MCA.46
The rationale for maintaining a per se approach to prevent anticompetitive effects is the same in every tying arrangement. First,
sellers who engage in tying arrangements force buyers to forego
the purchase of a substitute for the tied product.47 This forced
purchase of the tied product denies market access to other suppliers
38

Id.
Id. at 1269.
40
Id. at 1268.
41
MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1268-69 (11th Cir. 1999).
42
Id. at 1269.
43
Id. at 1277-78.
44
522 U.S. 3 (1997).
45
Id. at 10 (explaining that the majority of commercial arrangements subject to the
antitrust laws are evaluated under the rule of reason standard).
46
See, e.g., MCA Television, 171 F.3d at 1277-78 (rejecting plaintiff’s assertion that in
State Oil the Supreme Court held that the correct standard to be applied when assessing
the legality of tying arrangements is the rule of reason standard).
47
See Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953).
39
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of that product.48 While these anti-competitive effects are most
likely to occur where the seller has “sufficient economic leverage”
in the market of the tying product to induce his customers to take
the tied product along with the tying item,49 the Supreme Court has
found “sufficient economic leverage” where the tying product is
unique.50 An example of uniqueness arises in the case of
copyrighted materials packaged in a television block-booking
arrangement,51 as illustrated in MCA.
The rationale for finding sufficient economic leverage in cases
involving copyrighted products derives from patent law cases52 and
the Copyright Act itself.53 Courts have always feared that the
copyright or patent holder may tie an inferior product to the
product under copyright or patent protection, thus shielding the
inferior program from having to stand on its own merits in the
marketplace.54 Similarly, the holder of the copyrighted monopoly

48
See Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947); see also Black v.
Magnolia Liquor Co., 355 U.S. 24, 26 (1957) (stating that “[a] wholesaler who compels a
retailer to buy an unwanted inventory as a condition to acquisition of needed articles
exacts a ‘quota’ from the retailer and excludes sales by competing wholesalers in the
statutory sense.”).
49
See United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 48 (1962) (affirming United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948)).
50
See id.
51
See id. (agreeing with the district court’s determination that a copyrighted film blockbooked for television use is ‘in itself a unique product’ with sufficient economic power to
impose an appreciable restraint on free competition).
52
See, e.g., Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 456 (1940) (stating that
a patentee may not “condition his license so as to tie the use of the patented device or
process to the use of other devices, processes or materials which lie outside of the
monopoly of the patented license.”). See also Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co.,
320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491
(1942).
53
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2001).
54
See, e.g., Motion Pictures Patent Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917)
(finding that conditioning the sale of a patented projector on use of the patentee’s films
constituted an illegal tie in); see also B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1941)
(declaring that a firm that owned the patented process for reinforcing shoe insoles could
not supply shoe manufacturers with the unpatented materials needed to utilize the
process); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1941) (holding illegal
under the Sherman Act a tying arrangement conditioning machine leases on the purchase
of salt tablets).
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who distributes features in a block-booking arrangement extends
that monopoly beyond the Copyright Act’s intended protection.55
Although preventing the extension of a copyright or patent
monopoly was the rationale for relegating block-booking to the per
se category of illegality,56 another case to address copyrighted
materials in a bulk sale context illustrates a permissive stance
toward exploitation of the copyright, thus distinguishing
copyrighted works from their patented counterparts.57
In
58
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. the
Court carved out an exception to the per se standard in cases
involving the block sale of copyrighted materials59 in the form of a
blanket license.60 The Court examined the special conditions of
the music industry to sidestep the strict per se approach.61 A
blanket license involves a tying arrangement whereby composers
and publishers join an organization to set one price for a bundle of
goods without the opportunity for individual negotiation of each
55

See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (stating that even
where all the films of the package are of equal quality, the requirement that all be taken if
one is desired increases the market for some and adds to the monopoly of the copyright);
see also Pape Television Co. v. Associated Artists Prod. Corp., 277 F.2d 750, 753 (1960)
(stating that enlargement of the copyright principle is condemned in reliance on the
principle which forbids the owner of a patent to condition its use on the use of other
patented or unpatented materials). The rationale is the same even in the context of tying
arrangements not involving copyrighted or patented materials. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 (1984) (stating that if power is used to impair
competition on the merits in another market, a potentially inferior product may be
insulated from competitive pressures).
56
See Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 157 (explaining that the district court condemned
the enlargement of the copyright by relying on the principle which forbids the patent
owner to condition its use on the purchase or use of other patented or unpatented
materials).
57
See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979)
(holding that the issuance of blanket licenses by ASCAP and BMI is not per se unlawful
under the antitrust laws).
58
441 U.S. 1 (1979).
59
See id.
60
Blanket licenses give licensees the right to perform any and all of the compositions
owned by the members or affiliates as often as the licensees desire for a stated term.
61
See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 20 (stating that the blanket license “accompanies the
integration of sales, monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized copyright use.”);
see also id. (stating that “individual sales transactions in the industry are quite expensive,
as would be individual monitoring and enforcement, especially in light of the resources of
single composers.”).
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song.62 However, because the members of the organizations63 in
Broadcast Music64 could individually license performances to
television networks and the organizations could not insist on the
blanket license,65 the Court found that television networks had a
genuine economic choice.66 This economic choice, together with
the special circumstances of the music industry,67 enabled the
Court to deny application of the per se rule.68 The Court’s inquiry
into the nature of the music industry in Broadcast Music has set a
precedent for discriminating against the per se approach in
copyrighted materials depending on an industry’s circumstances.69
In two cases involving a practice specific to the motion picture
industry, the industry in which block-booking was first
condemned,70 courts have permitted the exploitation of the
copyright in sales involving the licensing of feature films.71 Both
62
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. American Soc’y of Composers, 400 F. Supp. 737, 741
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (stating that ASCAP was organized as a “clearinghouse” for copyright
owners and users to solve problems associated with the licensing of music).
63
ASCAP and BMI.
64
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
65
Id. at 11.
66
Id.
67
See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
68
See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 20 (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372
U.S. 253, 263 (1963)) (stating that the blanket license, as we see it, is not a “naked
restraint of trade with no purpose except the stifling of competition.”).
69
See, e.g., Nynex Corp. v. Discon Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998)(holding that the per se
group boycott rule does not apply to a single buyer’s decision to buy from one seller
rather than from another in the telecommunications industry). Compare Arizona v.
Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 349-51 (1982) (stating that per se treatment
is appropriate once experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to
predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it), with White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) (explaining that we need to know more about the
actual impact of these arrangements on competition before deciding whether they should
be classified as per se violations of the Sherman Act), and Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind.
Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986) (indicating that the Court will not adopt a
per se standard where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately
obvious).
70
See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 159 (1948).
71
Theee Movies of Tarzana v. Pac. Theatres, Inc., 828 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988) (stating that clearances that a movie theater received
from its distributor encouraged interbrand competition by forcing competitors to find
alternative subrun movies to exhibit and promote); Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp.,
79 F.3d 1358, 1372 (3d Cir. 1996) (permitting the practice of exclusively licensing films
to exhibitors in a prescribed area, also known as clearances).
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the Third and Ninth Circuits upheld clearances 72 in Orson, Inc. v.
Miramax Film Corp.73 and Theee Movies of Tarzana v. Pacific
Theatres Inc.74
In the motion picture industry, film distributors grant clearances
by licensing films to theaters for exhibition for a given amount of
time.75 In Orson76 and Theee Movies of Tarzana,77 the license was
exclusive so that the film was not licensed to other exhibitors for a
specific duration.78 Because this practice provided the film
distributor who held the copyright with the opportunity to
discriminate among theaters,79 the practice was arguably an
exploitation of the copyright monopoly contra to the patent cases
relied upon to reject block-booking in Paramount Pictures.80
Moreover, the power to exploit the copyright monopoly and
thereby restrain trade was potentially greater in an exclusive
contract.
An exclusive contract that gave certain theaters first preference
in the release of films was more dangerous than a block-booking
arrangement. A film’s profitability is directly related to the length
of its run, with a first run producing greater box office profits than
subsequent runs. However, the Orson court had no reason to

72

Orson, 79 F.3d at 1362; Theee Movies of Tarzana, 828 F.2d at 1399 (stating that “[i]n
the motion picture industry, film distributors license films to theaters for exhibition for a
given amount of time. Frequently, the license is exclusive, providing that during its
duration, the film will not be licensed to other exhibitors in a prescribed area. Such
licenses are called ‘clearances’.”).
73
79 F.3d 1358 (3d Cir. 1996).
74
828 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1987).
75
See Orson, 79 F.3d at 1362.
76
79 F.3d 1358.
77
828 F.2d 1395.
78
Id.
79
Theee Movies of Tarzana v. Pac. Theatres, Inc., 828 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987)
(quoting Naumkeag Theatres Co., Inc. v. New England Theatres Inc., 345 F.2d 910, 912
(1st Cir. 1965)) (stating that “[t]he whole system of runs and clearances discriminates
between competing exhibitors.”).
80
See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 157 (1948) (citing Ethyl
Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940)); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent
Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944) Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488
(1942).
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believe that the rule of reason standard could not adequately
sanction or condemn the practice.81
The Paramount Pictures Court also addressed the issue of
clearances, finding the particular arrangement an unreasonable
restraint of trade,82 but refused to relegate the practice to per se
illegality.83
Indeed, the Court’s decision to refrain from
categorizing clearances as per se illegal in 194884 enabled other
courts to permit the practice where it enhanced competition.85
Because the Supreme Court has previously tailored Sherman Act
jurisprudence to the circumstances of an industry86 and recognized
that exploiting a copyright may not always result in unreasonable
restraints of trade,87 block-booking may no longer warrant per se
illegality under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.88 On the other hand,
the Court’s recent declaration of the usefulness of the per se
standard for arrangements not formally removed from the
category,89 indicates that block-booking may forever remain
stigmatized as illegal per se.90

81

Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1367 (3d Cir. 1996).
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 147 (agreeing with the District Court that the
evidence supported the finding of a conspiracy to restrain trade by imposing unreasonable
clearances).
83
Id. at 145 (stating that “[t]he Department of Justice maintained below that clearances
are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act. But that is a question we need not consider,
for the District Court ruled otherwise and that conclusion is not challenged here.”).
84
Id.
85
See Orson, 79 F.3d at 1367; see also Theee Movies of Tarzana, 828 F.2d at 1399.
86
See e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
441 U.S. 1 (1979).
87
See Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1367 (3d Cir. 1996).
88
See Peck, supra note 4, at 6.
89
See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (reaffirming that some forms of
restraint on trade have such limited potential for pro-competitive benefit and such
predictable and pernicious anti-competitive effect, that they are deemed unlawful per se).
90
But see id. at 4 (reasoning that “[s]tare decisis is not an inexorable command,
particularly in the area of antitrust law, where there is a competing interest in recognizing
and adapting to changed circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience.”).
82
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A. Block-Booking Should Continue to be Evaluated under a Per Se
Approach.
“Where a plaintiff proves conduct that falls within a per se
category, nothing more is needed for liability; the defendant’s
power, illicit purpose and anticompetitive effect are all said to be
irrelevant.”91 For a practice to warrant per se illegality, a court
must have enough experience with a particular practice to know
that the alternative rule of reason standard would condemn it.92
While only a few business practices have made it into the per se
category,93 the costs savings pursuant to the per se standard are
greater than the loss of any benefits that might potentially result
from these arrangements should they prove to be reasonable.94
Thus, with the exception of price-fixing arrangements to which the
per se standard no longer applies,95 the Supreme Court has guarded
its duty under the Sherman Act by refusing to lift tying
arrangements from per se status.96
The Supreme Court created the per se standard for tying
arrangements in Int’l Salt Co. v. United States97 because tying
arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition by
foreclosing entry to the market in the tied product.98 Even in its
more recent tying analysis,99 the Court has articulated that the per
se standard reflects congressional concern about the anti-

91
Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found. Inc., 152 F.3d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 1998); see,
e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
92
See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 349-50 (1982).
93
See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (explaining that price fixing,
division of markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements have all been declared per se
illegal).
94
See Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 344 n.14 (citing F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 438-43 (1970)).
95
See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 18 (1997).
96
See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984) (reasoning that
“[i]t is far too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition
that certain tying arrangements pose an acceptable risk of stifling competition and
therefore are unreasonable ‘per se.’”).
97
332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
98
See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 10-12.
99
See id. at 11-20.
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competitive character of tying arrangements.100 Thus, any attempt
to evaluate these arrangements under the rule of reason must be
cautiously made.
Although circuit courts bravely evaluating tying arrangements
beyond the strict per se approach are split on the exact analysis,101
it is clear that no court has evaluated the practice under a full rule
of reason standard.102 The reluctance of courts to adopt the rule of
reason for tying arrangements reflects the degree to which these
arrangements potentially restrain trade.103 At the very least,
officially keeping tying arrangements in the per se category causes
courts to proceed with added caution.104
One area in which the tying arrangement has great potential to
unreasonably restrain trade is in the block-booking arrangement.105
As previously noted, the result of the block-booking arrangement
is to extend the copyright monopoly.106 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has dealt with enough patent monopolization cases107 and motion
100

Id. at 10 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 627, at 10-13 (1914)).
Compare Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 338 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1964)
(requiring the distributor to receive a direct economic benefit from sales of a tied product
to violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act), with Gonzalez v. St. Margaret’s House Hous.
Dev. Fund Corp., 880 F.2d 1514, 1516-17 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting the direct benefit test
and requiring five elements including: a tying and tied product; actual coercion by the
seller for the buyer to accept the tied product; sufficient economic leverage in the tying
product; anti-competitive effects in the tied market; and involvement of a “not
insubstantial amount” of interstate commerce in the tied market).
102
See, e.g., White v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd., 820 F.2d 98 (4th Cir. 1987); Carl
Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass’n v. First Condo. Dev. Co., 758 F.2d 203, 210-11 (7th Cir.
1985); Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705 (11th Cir. 1984).
103
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1958) (reasoning that tying
agreements serve little purpose beyond the suppression of competition).
104
See, e.g., Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 58 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing
considerable logic for using the direct economic benefit criterion even though the court
did not have occasion to adopt the requirement); see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.
2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984) (indicating that it is far too late to remove certain tying
arrangements from the per se standard).
105
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (stating that
“[e]ven where all the films included in the package are of equal quality, the requirements
that all be taken if one is desired increases the market for some. Each stands not on its
own footing but in whole or in part on the appeal which another film may have.”).
106
See id.
107
See, e.g., Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Mercoid Corp. v.
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944) (hereinafter Mercoid II);
101
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picture block-booking cases108 for lower courts to declare with
certainty that television block-booking is also an unreasonable
restraint of trade.109 When a television programming distributor
forces a television exhibitor110 to accept an inferior program in a
tying arrangement, he or she impedes other distributors from
bidding for that exhibitor’s time slot111 while obtaining an above
market price for the inferior tied product.112 In the case of the
small network,113 tying results in a clear absence of economic
choice.114 The small network must forego the opportunity to
exhibit a superior program from another distributor in the tied
program’s time slot.115 Since television program tying is bound to
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) (hereinafter Mercoid I);
B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,
314 U.S. 488 (1942); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.
502 (1917).
108
See United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S.
131.
109
See, e.g., MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1999);
Pape Television Co. v. Associated Artists Prod. Corp., 277 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1960); Six
W. Retail Acquisition Inc. v. Sony Theatre Mgmt. Corp., No. 97 Civ. 5499, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2604, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2000); see also Arizona v. Maricopa County
Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (stating that “[o]nce experience with a particular
kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will
condemn it, it has applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint is unreasonable.”).
110
See, e.g., MCA Television, 171 F.3d at 1265; Pape Television, 277 F.2d at 750.
111
See Fields Prod. v. United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp 87, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(explaining that in the motion picture industry, block-booking has been found to deprive
competing distributors of an opportunity to license their own movies to the coerced
theaters).
112
See Times-Picayune Publ’g. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953) (stating
that by “conditioning his sale of one commodity on the purchase of another, a seller
coerces the abdication of buyers’ independent judgment as to the tied product’s merits
and insulates it from the competitive stresses of the open market.”).
113
See MCA Television, 171 F.3d at 1268 (explaining that Public Interest Corporation
was a Florida corporation that owned and operated television station WTMV-TV in
Lakeland, Florida); Pape Television, 277 F.2d at 751 (stating that Pape Television also
ran a station in Alabama).
114
See Broadcast Music, Inc., v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 2 (1979)
(indicating that the positive aspect of the ASCAP blanket license was that it offered the
applicant a genuine economic choice). See also Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79
F.3d 1358, 1372 (3d Cir. 1996) (indicating that alternative sources of supply negated the
anti-competitive effects of the movie clearances).
115
See, e.g., MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1279 (11th Cir.
1999) (stating that in determining the coercive use of the distributor’s copyright, the court
would not rely on the fact that the exhibitor found the programs that it wanted appealing,
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result in such an unreasonable restraint of trade,116 the Supreme
Court, addressing television block-booking, would likely reaffirm
its holding in Paramount Pictures117 that block-booking is per se
illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.118 Indeed, the unique
nature of the copyright monopoly119 and policy behind that
monopoly requires the Court to reaffirm its initial position.120
That the syndicated licensor reaps added benefits by tying
products that he did not create is further reason to continue with
the per se standard. Although Congress grants the copyright
monopoly to encourage the public dissemination of useful
works,121 a copyright holder does not serve the public interest by
offering to license a work without regard to the quality of the
copyright.122 Because block-booking results in the forcing of an
inferior film by attaching it to a quality film, the rationale of
disseminating useful works is compromised.123
but to the fact that it found the unwanted programs unappealing).
See also Paddock Publ’n Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42, 47 (7th Cir. 1996)
(noting that Babylon 5, a television program, “appeared exclusively on WPWR-TV
(Channel 50) in Chicago and almost all other shows are exhibited exclusively on one
channel per locale, and sticking with that station for their entire original production run,
even though individual stations or producers may not have had market power.”).
116
See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (explaining that
virtually all business agreements restrain trade to some extent; Section 1, therefore, has
been construed to make illegal only those contracts that constitute unreasonable restraints
of trade); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948) (stating that “[a]
restraint may be unreasonable either because an otherwise reasonable restraint is
accompanied by a specific intent to accomplish a forbidden restraint or because it falls
within the class of restraints that are illegal per se.”).
117
334 U.S. 131 (1948).
118
See MCA Television Ltd., 171 F.3d at 1278 (reasoning that the Supreme Court has
twice declared that block-booking contracts are among those economic arrangements that
will “always merit a finding of per se illegality.”).
119
See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 619 (1977)
(stating that the copyright monopolies in Paramount Pictures and Loew’s “represented
tying products that the court regarded as sufficiently unique to give rise to a presumption
of economic power.”).
120
See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1968)
(stating that courts must take the Copyright Act as they find it and only Congress may
“accommodate various competing considerations of copyright, communications and
antitrust policy.”).
121
See H.R. Rep. No. 2222, at 7 (1909).
122
See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
123
See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
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Moreover, the second rationale of the Copyright Act, to induce
creative genius through copyright protection,124 is not served in the
typical block-booking arrangement. Because film distributors are
assigned all the rights to content for film production125 or because
the content of a film is made through work-for-hire agreements,126
the creators are already compensated for their work by the time the
feature is involved in a block-booking arrangement.127 Enabling a
licensor to engage in block-booking and reap the benefits of the
copyright monopoly128 would therefore not encourage creative
genius where the licensor was not the creator in the first place.
Thus, preventing the block-booking arrangement does not
discourage creation, since the creators of film content have already
been compensated.129 Because the block-booking arrangement
does not further the policies of the Copyright Act,130 the antitrust
laws should be broadly interpreted to prevent this type of
arrangement.131 On the other hand, impeding a licensor’s ability to
distribute programming on its own terms may result in fewer
purchases from screenwriters by distributors.132 Thus, any attempt
124

See H.R. Rep. No. 2222, at 7 (1909).
See Judith A. Silver, A Bad Dream: In Search of a Legal Framework
For Copyright Infringement Claims Involving Digital Imagery in Motion Pictures, 35
IDEA 407, 411 (1995).
126
See Karen L. Gulick, Creative Control, Attribution, and the Need for Disclosure: A
Study of Incentives in the Motion Picture Industry, 27 CONN. L. REV. 53, 56 (1994)
(explaining that work-for-hire agreements join the efforts of director, choreographer, and
screenwriter at the expense of the production company who in return is designated as
author of the work for copyright purposes).
127
See id.
128
See Gulick, supra note 126.
129
See Fields Prod. v. United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
130
See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (reasoning that
“[i]t is said that the reward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the public of
the products of his creative genius. But the reward does not serve its public purpose if it
is not related to the quality of the copyright. Where a high quality film greatly desired is
licensed only if an inferior one is taken, the latter borrows quality from the former and
strengthens its monopoly by drawing on the other.”).
131
See LAWRENCE I. WOOD, PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAW xiv (1942) (stating that the
antitrust laws are directed to the public welfare and “wherever possible those laws should
be given the widest possible latitude.”).
132
See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMPETITION
POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS REPORT 8 (1989) (discussing how the
application of competition laws to licensing agreements may indirectly affect the
incentives to create by influencing market structure).
125
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to regulate television block-booking could adversely affect the
market for innovation,133 contrary to the policy of the Copyright
Act.134
Even if television programming is not sufficiently unique to
provide the Supreme Court with an adequate basis for applying the
Paramount Pictures holding135 to television block-booking
arrangements, an outright rejection of the per se approach is still
not justified under a State Oil Co. v. Khan analysis.136 State Oil
dealt specifically with vertical price-fixing arrangements.137 In a
vertical price-fixing arrangement, the supplier sets the prices at
which distributors may sell their products, restraining their ability
to sell in accordance with their own judgment.138 Although the
Supreme Court held vertical maximum price-fixing to be illegal
per se in Albrecht v. Herald Co.,139 the State Oil Court
acknowledged that an outright ban on price discrimination actually
prompted suppliers to enter the distribution market.140 With the
rationale behind Albrecht eliminated,141 the Court declared that
mere precedent did not justify continuing a strict per se standard
on price-fixing142 where a rule of reason analysis would suffice.143
133

Id.
See H.R. Rep. No. 2222, at 7 (1909).
135
See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 159 (1948).
136
522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (stating that the rule of reason analysis can effectively identify
anti-competitive conduct in vertical price-fixing arrangements as in most commercial
arrangements subject to antitrust law).
137
Id. (noting that while the inquiry in overruling Albrecht involved consideration of the
antitrust laws in all vertical arrangements, State Oil was the first time since Albrecht that
the Court confronted a maximum price-fixing arrangement).
138
See Kiefe Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951).
See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (stating that
all business combinations formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising,
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or
foreign commerce are illegal per se).
139
390 U.S. 145 (1968).
140
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 16 (1997) (quoting 7 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 1635, at 395 (Supp. 1989)) (stating that “[t]he ban on
maximum resale price limitations declared in Albrecht in the name of ‘dealer freedom’
has actually prompted many suppliers to integrate forward into distribution, thus
eliminating the very independent trader for whom Albrecht professed solicitude.”).
141
Id.
142
Id. at 20 (stating that “[i]n the area of antitrust law, there is a competing interest, well134
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While State Oil overruled Albrecht’s per se approach for vertical
price-fixing,144 the decision does not stand for a rejection of per se
illegality in the context of block-booking.145 In fact, the inhibiting
result of Albrecht on dealer freedom whereby distributors enter the
market instead of controlling prices,146 is not an issue in blockbooking. As Broadcast Music147 illustrates, the business of
providing copyrighted materials is strictly organized along the
lines of composers, distributors, and exhibitors. Moreover,
safeguards exist to prevent vertical integration in the motion
picture148 and television industries.149
Thus, the fear that
distributors would vertically integrate by entering the exhibiting
market was not the rationale for applying the per se standard in
block-booking. While the possibility that a small television
network will face competition from larger network conglomerates
always exists,150 antitrust law is primarily concerned with
protecting interbrand competition.151 Thus, as long as the per se
represented in this Court’s decisions, in recognizing and adapting to changed
circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience.”).
143
Id. at 22 (reasoning that “[i]n our view, rule of reason analysis will effectively identify
those situations in which vertical maximum price fixing amounts to anticompetitive
conduct.”).
144
See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
145
See, e.g., MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1277-78 (11th
Cir. 1999) (stating that State Oil does not stand for a rejection of the per se standard in
any context other than in vertical maximum price-fixing).
146
See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 4 (1997) (noting that “Albrecht’s theoretical
justifications for its per se rule [was] that vertical maximum price fixing could interfere
with dealer freedom. . . .”).
147
441 U.S. 1, 9 (1978).
148
Southway Theatres Inc. v. Georgia Theater Co., 672 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1982)
(stating that “[a]lthough the motion picture industry was once vertically integrated, court
decrees have forced distributors and producers to divest themselves of ownership in
theatres.”).
149
See Schurz Communications v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 982 F.2d 1043, 1045
(7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that for twenty years, F.C.C. regulations have prevented the
ABC, NBC, and CBS networks from syndicating programs).
150
See, e.g., Carol Matlack, Welcome to the Real World, BUS. WK., December 4, 2000, at
54, 55 (stating that antitrust authorities have cleared the way for Vivendi’s takeover of
Seagram Co., creating the world’s second largest media group and putting pressure on
media giant AOL Time Warner).
151
See Continental Television Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977)
(explaining that interbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers of
the same generic product and is the primary concern of antitrust law. In contrast,
intrabrand competition is the competition between the distributors of the product of a
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rejection of block-booking arrangements continues to stimulate
competition among distributors of television programming,152 there
is no economic reason to extend State Oil to television blockbooking arrangements.153
While the economic reasons that existed in State Oil for
rejecting the per se approach154 in vertical price-fixing
arrangements are not present in television block-booking
arrangements,155 the legal reasoning differs as well. While
precedent consistently labels block-booking arrangements as
illegal per se,156 the major cases involving vertical price-fixing
vary in both facts and result.157 The Court has justified these
particular manufacturer). When interbrand competition exists, it provides a significant
check on the exploitation of intrabrand market power because of the ability of consumers
to substitute a different brand of the same product. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3,
14 (1997) (quoting 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1987)) (explaining
that the Court’s “recent decisions recognize the possibility that a vertical restraint
imposed by a single manufacturer or wholesaler may stimulate interbrand competition
even as it reduces intrabrand competition”); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988) (stating that the primary purpose of the antitrust laws is
to protect interbrand competition).
152
See United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1962) (indicating that the
adverse effects of illegal block-booking contracts included foreclosing other distributors
being from selling to the stations).
153
Compare MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1278 (11th Cir.
1999) (reasoning that block-booking contracts will always merit per se illegality), with
State Oil, 522 U.S. at 15 (concluding that vertically imposed maximum prices no longer
merit per se treatment).
154
See State Oil, 522 U.S. at 15-18.
155
See id. at 16-17.
156
See Loew’s, 371 U.S. 38; United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948);
Pape Television Co. v. Associated Artists Prod. Co., 277 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1960); Six
W. Retail Acquisition v. Sony Theatre Mgmt. Corp., No. 97 Civ. 5499, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2604, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2000).
157
See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1950) (holding all
business combinations formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing,
fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce
illegal per se); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)
(holding illegal agreements under which manufacturers or suppliers set the minimum
resale prices to be charged by their distributors); Compare White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (determining that too little was known about the competitive
impact of a manufacturer’s assignment of exclusive territories to its distributors to treat it
as per se unlawful), with United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)
(holding that a supplier’s imposition of territorial rights or franchises on the distributor
was so obviously destructive of competition as to be per se illegal), and Albrecht v.
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variations by emphasizing subtle factual distinctions in cases158
while overlooking stare decisis.159 By contrast, since Paramount
Pictures160 the courts have steadfastly held block-booking to be
illegal per se.161
The rationale for holding motion picture block-booking illegal
per se in Paramount Pictures was to prevent improper extensions
of the copyright monopoly.162 The Paramount Pictures decision
relied upon the judicial history of patent law to buttress its
rejection of block-booking arrangements.163 In light of the longHerald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that vertical maximum price-fixing constituted
a per se violation of the Sherman Act). But see Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling Schwinn and rejecting a per se rule in the context
of vertical nonprice restrictions) and State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (overruling
Albrecht and holding that vertical maximum price-fixing would be evaluated under the
rule of reason standard).
158
See, e.g., GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51 n.19 (declining to comment on Albrecht’s per
se treatment of vertical maximum price restrictions, noting that the issue “involved
significantly different questions of analysis and policy”); Arizona v. Maricopa County
Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 n.18 (1982) (noting that the restraint was more defensible
because it was vertical rather than horizontal); White Motor Co., 372 U.S. at 261 (stating
that too little was known about the competitive impact of a manufacturer’s assignment of
exclusive territories to its distributors to be treated as per se unlawful).
159
Cf. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (stating that stare decisis reflects a policy judgment that “in most matters it is
more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right”);
but see Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (commenting that “stare decisis is
the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent
development of legal principles and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of
the judicial process.”). Compare Ill. Brick Co. v. Ill., 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977)
(expressing reluctance to overrule decisions involving statutory interpretation), with Nat’l
Soc’y of Prof. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (stating that the general
presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with
respect to the Sherman Act).
160
334 U.S. 131 (1948).
161
See, e.g., MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1278 (11th Cir.
1999).
162
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 157 (1948) (agreeing with the district court’s
finding that block-booking “adds to the monopoly of a single copyrighted picture that of
another copyrighted picture which must be taken and exhibited in order to secure the
first.”).
163
334 U.S. at 157 (citing Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 459
(1940)) (stating “[t]hat enlargement of the monopoly of the copyright was condemned
below in reliance on the principle that forbids the owner of a patent to condition its use
on the purchase or use of patented or unpatented materials.”); Mercoid Corp. v. MidContinent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314
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standing patent precedent164 and the courts’ clear rejection of
television
block-booking
block-booking
arrangements,165
arrangements warrant a per se approach.166 Thus, unlike the
vertical price-fixing cases,167 the Supreme Court could not rely on
inconsistent precedent168 to change its per se approach in this
unusual tying arrangement.169 On the other hand, the present
Supreme Court has relinquished long-standing doctrine in the
past170 and could once again apply policy over precedent in
addressing the issue of block-booking.171
In light of consistent precedent for adhering to the per se
approach in television block-booking arrangements,172 the
approach should continue to be applied in the name of judicial
efficiency.173 Although antitrust law warrants innovation through
U.S. 488, 491 (1942).
164
See, e.g., Morton Salt, 314 U.S. 488.
165
See United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); United States v. Paramount
Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948); Pape Television Co. v. Associated Artists Prod. Corp., 277
F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1960); Six W. Retail Acquisition, Inc. v. Sony Theatre Mgmt. Corp.,
No. 97 Civ. 5499, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2604, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2000).
166
See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1968)
(stating that courts must take the Copyright Act as they find it and only Congress may
accommodate the competing considerations of copyright, communications and antitrust
policy).
167
See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951);
United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
168
See, e.g., Theee Movies of Tarzana, 828 F.2d at 1399.
169
See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 9 (1984) (stating that
“[i]t is far too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition
that certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and
therefore are unreasonable per se.”).
170
See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473
U.S. 402 (1985) and rejecting the long-standing principle that public school teachers on
parochial school premises are assumed to inculcate religious doctrine).
171
One example of the Court’s placement of policy over precedent occurred in the
context of public aid to parochial schools. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000)
(declaring that anti-Catholic sentiment has existed in this country for far too long).
172
See MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1278 (11th Cir.
1999).
173
See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (stating that “stare decisis is
the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent
development of legal principles.”). Cf. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S.
717, 732-33 (1988) (stating that “[o]f course the common law, both in general and as
embodied in the Sherman Act, does not lightly assume that the economic realities
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common law rather than static application of rigid rules,174
innovation in technology increases lawsuits.175 A per se rule
would not only alleviate clogged dockets,176 but also ensure that
interbrand competition thrives in the media marketplace in
accordance with the spirit of antitrust law.177 This would entail
giving a small local network like PIC the choice to exhibit
programming without the limitations of a block-booking
arrangement. On the other hand, because of innovation in the
television industry,178 the per se standard for block-booking may
have become an antiquated rule in the television context.179 Blockbooking may be the only method by which a financially challenged
network can procure programming. In block-booking agreements,
the licensor foregoes cash payment in exchange for the station’s
underlying earlier decisions have changed, or that earlier judicial perceptions of those
realities were in error. It is relevant, therefore, whether the common law of restraint of
trade ever prohibited as illegal per se an agreement of the sort made here, and whether
our decisions under section 1 of the Sherman Act have ever expressed or necessarily
implied such a prohibition.”).
174
See Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 732 (stating that restraint of trade in violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act “invokes the common law itself and not merely the static content that the
common law had assigned to the term in 1890.”); see also United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 392 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that “the state
of the common law 400 or even 100 years ago is irrelevant to the issue before us: the
effect of the antitrust laws upon vertical distributional restraints in the American
economy today.”).
175
See, e.g., Cmty. Television of S. Cal. v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498 (1983)
(acknowledging the public interest in making television broadcasting more available yet
reasoning that standard should be the same whether public or private); Microsoft v.
United States, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000); Addamax Corp. v. Open Software
Found., Inc., 152 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 1998); Carol Matlack, Welcome to the Real World,
BUS. WK., Dec. 4, 2000, at 54, 55 (stating that to win European antitrust approval,
Vivendi had to promise that Vivendi Universal’s content would be freely available to
competing distributors after the takeover).
176
Steven E. Feldman et al., Mandatory Disclosure and Rocket Dockets: Accelerating the
Processes of Litigation, 456 PLI/Pat. 269, 283 (Nov. 1996) (stating that “[s]ection 471 of
the Civil Justice Reform Act requires that each United States District Court implement a
Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan to facilitate deliberate adjudication of
civil cases on the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure
just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes.”).
177
See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. Of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 88 n.36 (1984).
178
See Turner Broad. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n., 910 F. Supp. 734 (D.D.C.
1995).
179
See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 21 (1997) (stating that “this court has
reconsidered its decisions construing the Sherman Act when the theoretical
underpinnings of those decisions are called into serious question.”).
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willingness to accept a program he might not desire.180 Continuing
with the per se approach to block-booking arrangements could
therefore foreclose the small, independent competitor offering
alternatives to viewers that opt out of cable. Thus, the per se
approach more easily enables large conglomerates to dominate the
market.181 In light of these possible effects of applying the per se
approach, using the rule of reason to evaluate block-booking
arrangements might enhance competition in the television industry.
B. The Per Se Standard Should not Apply to Block-Booking
Arrangements
The Supreme Court has stated that only the most anticompetitive arrangements deserve the strict per se approach,182 and
that the number of arrangements warranting this approach has
declined with time.183 Tying arrangements,184 especially those
arrangements which expand a copyright holder’s monopoly over
his copyright,185 have traditionally warranted the per se approach.
However, in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,186 the
Supreme Court acknowledged the circumstances under which per
180

See MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1268 (11th Cir.
1999).
181
See id. In MCA, Public Interest Corporation was a typical public television network.
182
See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (stating that only those
arrangements having a pernicious effect on competition and lacking any redeeming virtue
should be classified as per se violations of the Sherman Act); see also State Oil, 522 U.S.
at 10 (noting the court’s own reluctance to adopt per se rules).
183
State Oil, 522 U.S. at 21 (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S.
717, 731-32 (1988)) (stating that although economic realities underlying earlier decisions
may not have changed, different types of agreements may amount to restraints of trade in
varying times and circumstances); see also id. (reasoning that “it would make no sense to
create out of the single term ‘restraint of trade’ a chronologically schizoid statute, in
which a ‘rule of reason’ evolves with new circumstances and new wisdom, but a line of
per se illegality remains forever fixed where it was.”).
184
Besides block-booking, examples of tying arrangements include franchisor restrictions
of a franchisee, distributor’s territorial restrictions of a retailer, and maximum price
setting agreements.
185
See United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 47 (1962) (stating that “[w]here a high
quality film greatly desired is licensed only if an inferior one is taken, the latter borrows
quality from the former and strengthens its monopoly by drawing on the other.”).
186
466 U.S. 2 (1984).
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se illegality is inappropriate.187 Jefferson Parish involved a
hospital tying arrangement of surgical operations and
anesthesiologist services.188 Although Jefferson Parish did not
involve the tie-in of intellectual property, the Court’s elaborate
inquiry into the market for the hospital’s services to patients189
reflected a rule of reason approach.190 The Court examined
whether the price, quality, supply or demand for the tying or tied
product had been adversely affected.191 Because an elaborate
inquiry192 led the Court to find that this tying arrangement failed to
unreasonably restrain trade,193 a precedent for upholding other
tying arrangements now exists.
Applying the Court’s criteria for upholding the tying
arrangement in Jefferson Parish194 to the Court’s decision to hold
block-booking illegal per se in Paramount Pictures195 indicates
that a similar arrangement would not always unreasonably restrain
trade. The Paramount Pictures Court never addressed whether the
price, quality, supply or demand for the tying or tied product had
been adversely affected,196 and instead relied heavily on the patent
law cases.197 Furthermore, the Paramount Pictures Court was
concerned about the vertical combination of producing,
distributing, and exhibiting motion pictures among the five major
motion picture producers. This vertical combination further
compounded the anti-competitive effects of the block-booking
arrangement.198 The special circumstances of the motion picture
187

See id. at 18 (explaining that when the seller lacks the requisite market power to force
customers to purchase an unwanted product, a plaintiff can only prove an antitrust
violation by presenting evidence of an unreasonable restraint on competition in the
relevant market).
188
See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 18.
189
Id. at 31 (stating that “there is no evidence that the price, the quality, or the supply or
demand for either the ‘tying product’ or the ‘tied product’ involved in this case has been
adversely affected.”).
190
Id. at 18-22.
191
Id. at 18.
192
Id. at 26-32.
193
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 32 (1984).
194
Id.
195
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156-59 (1948).
196
See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 31.
197
See id. at 21 n.30.
198
See Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 140-41.
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industry caused a restraint of interstate trade in the distribution and
exhibition of films.199 While adding a block-booking arrangement
to this vertical combination would have unreasonably restrained
trade,200 the Court’s finding of per se illegality was too broad. At
the very least, the Court has relinquished its disdain for vertical
arrangements,201 a condition that led to the Paramount Pictures
holding.202 Thus, the Court should again address its standard for
block-booking under State Oil.
The State Oil Court indicated that the concerns inducing the
Albrecht Court to find vertical maximum price fixing illegal per
se203 no longer justified this harsh standard.204 The Court further
noted the lack of cases directed against the type of conduct
condemned in Albrecht.205 Applying State Oil’s rationale to blockbooking, a court could clearly identify how and when a blockbooking arrangement would result in an unreasonable restraint of
trade.206 Furthermore, the infrequency with which the Court has
addressed block-booking207 and the fact that these suits were never
brought by a private party, may indicate the extent to which blockbooking facilitates transactions with exhibitors. Continuing with a
per se standard could increase transaction costs where a block-

199

See id. at 141.
See id.
201
See, e.g., Cont’l Television, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling
Schwinn); see also Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-54 (1968) (vertical
maximum price-fixing is a per se antitrust violation); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3,
20 (1997) (overruling Albrecht).
202
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 143-44 (1948).
203
State Oil, 522 U.S. at 16-18 (observing that the justifications for applying the per se
standard to vertical maximum price-fixing in Albrecht included interference with dealer
freedom, restriction on dealers’ ability to offer essential or desired services and a disguise
for minimum price-fixing schemes).
204
Id. at 15 (stating that “it [is] difficult to maintain that vertically-imposed maximum
price fixing could harm consumers or competition to the extent necessary to justify [its]
per se invalidation.”).
205
Id. at 18-19.
206
See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 159 (1948)
(suggesting that films may be sold in blocks or groups without a requirement to purchase
more than one film).
207
To date, the Supreme Court has only addressed block-booking in two cases. See id.;
see also United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 47 (1962).
200
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booking arrangement might be in the parties’ best interests.208 On
the other hand, despite the State Oil Court’s thorough analysis of
arrangements warranting the per se standard, block-booking was
not mentioned.209 This oversight could indicate that the vertical
block-booking arrangement is a beast of its own, best analyzed in
accordance with other tying cases involving intellectual
property.210
While the Supreme Court’s finding that block-booking
arrangements are illegal per se rests in part on the principle that a
copyright holder may not expand his monopoly,211 this rationale is
weak in the television block-booking context. The patent law
cases,212 on which the copyright tying case relies,213 focus on
preventing a distributor from exploiting the uniqueness of his
invention.214 Although the Eleventh Circuit recently relied on
precedent prohibiting copyright exploitation215 and found the
television block-booking arrangement in MCA illegal per se,216 the
facts of that case217 indicate that this precedent does not carry the
same weight in television block-booking as in patent law or other
tying cases.218
208

For example, Albrecht gave rise to litigation between distributors and publishers in the
newspaper industry. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 16 (1997) (citing P. AREEDA
& H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, at 599-614 (Supp. 1996)).
209
See id. at 10-22.
210
See B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1941); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S.
Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1941); Motion Pictures Patent Co. v. Universal Film Mfg.
Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
211
See Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 157-58.
212
See e.g., B.B. Chemical, 314 U.S. 495 (1941); Morton Salt, 314 U.S. 488 (1941);
Motion Pictures, 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
213
See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131,
156-59 (1948).
214
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (stating that “[t]he sole interest of
the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”).
215
See MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265,
1276-79 (11th Cir. 1999).
216
See id.
217
See infra Part I.
218
See Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v.
United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
(1958); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
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First, the danger of a creator attempting to exploit his monopoly
by receiving the same price for an inferior program through tying
is absent where, as in MCA, the distributor is not the creator, but a
licensor of the program.219 Second, the television block-booking
arrangement bears a greater resemblance to the Broadcast Music
blanket licensing arrangement,220 or the film clearances in Orson,
which the Court refused to declare illegal per se.221
The Supreme Court’s refusal to find the blanket license illegal
per se in Broadcast Music222 resulted from an examination into the
television network industry.223 The Court found that the blanket
license offered by ASCAP and BMI was more efficient than
individual negotiations between networks and composers.224 This
efficiency, coupled with individual negotiations if the smaller
networks so desired,225 led the Court to find that the blanket license
219

Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 398 (1968) (stating
that while the television broadcaster does less than the motion picture exhibitor because
he only supplies electronic signals, courts have nonetheless treated broadcasters as
exhibitors).
220
See Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc. v. American Soc’y of Composers, 400 F. Supp. 737,
741 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The blanket license gives licensees the right to perform any and all
of the compositions owned by the members as often as the licensees desire for a stated
term. Radio and television broadcasters are the largest users of the blanket license. Fees
are ordinarily a percentage of total revenues or a flat dollar amount and do not ordinarily
depend on the amount or type of music used. Thus, the broadcast network may in fact
receive music in the blanket license that it otherwise might not desire or that is not worth
the flat rate. The blanket license has been considered a “clearinghouse” for copyright
owners and users to solve the problems associated with music licensing.
221
See Orson Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1370-72 (3d Cir. 1996).
222
441 U.S. 1 (1979).
223
Id. at 14-15 (stating that “‘[t]he extraordinary number of users spread across the land,
the ease with which a performance may be broadcast, the sheer volume of copyrighted
compositions, the enormous quantity of separate performances each year, the
impracticability of negotiating individual licenses for each composition, and the
ephemeral nature of each performance all combine to create unique market conditions for
performance rights to recorded music.’”) (quoting Mem. for U.S. as Amicus Curiae on
Pet. for Cert. in K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publ’g Corp., O.T. 1967, No. 147, at 10-11
(1979)).
224
Id. at 20 (explaining that “[a] middleman with a blanket license was an obvious
necessity if the thousands of individual negotiations, a virtual impossibility, were to be
avoided. Also, individual fees for the use of individual compositions would presuppose
an intricate schedule of fees and uses, as well as a difficult and expensive reporting
problem for the user and policing task for the copyright owner.”).
225
See id. at 12 (acknowledging that “there are no practical impediments preventing
direct dealing by the television networks if they so desire.”).
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did not warrant per se illegality.226 The fact that networks were
forced to purchase some songs that they otherwise might not desire
was a small disadvantage in light of the conveniences conferred by
the blanket license.227
Just as the blanket license insures that smaller networks are not
shut out of the bidding process for the works of various composers
and publishers,228 block-booking in the television industry
enhances the attractiveness of a small exhibitor with little
bargaining power to a powerful distributor commonly engaged in
the practice.229
Although the television block-booking
arrangement may cause a network to accept a program the network
would not otherwise exhibit,230 the arrangement enables the
smaller network to remain competitive. Without block-booking,
the distributor may find other takers in the vast television
industry.231 Because many exhibitors depend upon the same
distributor to remain in business, the Supreme Court will be
inhibiting free enterprise should it continue to apply a per se
standard to television block-booking. As Broadcast Music
illustrates, the Supreme Court has previously recognized that

226

See id. at 24 (declaring that the blanket license “should be subject to a more
discriminating examination under the rule of reason.”).
227
See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 22 (1979); see
also E. Scott Johnson, Considering the Source-Licensing Threat to Performing Rights in
Music Copyrights, 6 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1, 10 (1989) (noting that
“[c]onvenience is the key to the blanket license. For certain music users, such as
nightclubs and restaurants, a blanket license is virtually imperative [because] [i]t is
practically impossible for such users to predict their musical requirements far enough in
advance to procure all the individual licenses needed to present variety entertainment.”).
228
See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 21 (1979)
(explaining that ASCAP provides the necessary resources for blanket sales and
enforcement, resources unavailable to the vast majority of composers and publishing
houses).
229
See Schurz Communications v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 98 F.2d 1043, 1047
(7th Cir. 1992) (highlighting the fact that with the repeal of the F.C.C. rules, ABC, NBC,
and CBS are now permitted to syndicate programming).
230
See MCA Television v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1268 (11th Cir. 1999).
231
See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 402 (1968)
(examining whether an entrepreneur who erected television antennas syndicating
broadcasts of copyrighted materials did not violate the Copyright Act because of due
regard to changing technology).
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special needs of certain industries cannot be addressed by a
sweeping rule such as the per se standard.232
In the case of clearances,233 the Court refused to apply the per se
standard despite recognition that clearances had dangerous
potential and similarities to the then per se illegal practice of pricefixing.234
Lower courts addressing clearances today have
recognized the pro-competitive effects that the practice has in the
motion picture industry.235 Although clearances also exploit the
copyright monopoly by exclusively licensing a copyrighted
feature, thereby advantaging some exhibiting theaters and
disadvantaging others,236 courts have used the rule of reason to
identify where this exclusive licensing actually restrains trade.237 A
similar approach should apply to block-booking. On the other
hand, when a distributor exclusively licenses a film as a clearance,
he is not tying that film to any other copyrighted feature, in
violation of cases indicating that tying intellectual property is
illegal per se.238 Overcoming this precedent could prove to be
difficult.
Although the Supreme Court has stated that the benefits of a
sweeping per se rule lie in the judicial efficiency created once
experience shows the anti-competitiveness of an arrangement,239
232
See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (declaring that professional
baseball qualifies for an antitrust exemption given baseball’s unique characteristics and
needs).
233
See generally Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1370 (3d Cir. 1996)
(providing a general discussion of what clearances are).
234
United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 148 (1948) (stating that
“[c]learances have been used along with price fixing to suppress competition with the
theatres of the exhibitor-defendants and with other favored exhibitors. The District Court
could therefore have eliminated clearances completely for a substantial period of time,
even though, as it thought, they were not illegal per se.”).
235
See Orson, 79 F.3d at 1372 (finding that the clearances promoted interbrand
competition by requiring the Roxy to seek out and exhibit other distributors’ films).
236
See id. (conceding that the clearances “reduced intrabrand competition by disallowing
the Roxy from showing on a first-run basis any Miramax film that the Ritz had
selected”).
237
See id. at 1371 (stating that clearances are subject to rule of reason treatment as
vertical non-price restraints of trade).
238
See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1941); Motion Pictures
Patent Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
239
See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (stating that
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the requisite experience is difficult to achieve in media industries
such as television that are constantly changing. Since the advent of
cable television, courts have been forced to reexamine their
holdings in an effort to keep pace with change.240 While a merger
or affiliation with a major network may be efficient for the small
network,241 a conglomerate could lead to a monopoly in violation
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.242 The terms of a block-booking
arrangement, while running the risk of being unfavorable to a
network, may also increase competition by keeping that network in
business. A court applying a per se standard without looking into
a particular industry’s circumstances would undoubtedly eliminate
cases on the judicial docket.243 However, economic efficiency
should not be sacrificed in the name of judicial efficiency.
III. REASON SHOULD RULE IN TELEVISION BLOCK-BOOKING
In State Oil, a landmark case in the Supreme Court’s Sherman
Act jurisprudence, the Court noted the necessity of reevaluating the
Albrecht standard of per se illegality in the context of vertical price
fixing244 in light of post-Albrecht decisions.245 Since Paramount
per se treatment is justified “[o]nce experience with a particular kind of restraint enables
the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it.”).
240
See, e.g., Schurz Communications v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 982 F.2d 1043,
1055-57 (7th Cir. 1992) (ordering the F.C.C. to readdress its restrictions on the major
networks).
241
See id. at 1053 (discussing the fact that many weak independent stations have become
affiliates of the new major network, Fox).
242
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2001) (providing that”[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a felony.”).
243
The elaborate inquiry into the reasonableness of a challenged business practice entails
significant costs. Litigation surrounding “effect” or “purpose” of a practice is often
extensive and complex. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); see
also Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (stating that for
the sake of litigation efficiency, “we have tolerated the invalidation of some agreements
that a full blown inquiry might have proved to be reasonable.”).
244
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (stating that “[a] review of this Court’s
decisions leading up to and beyond Albrecht is relevant to our assessment of the
continuing validity of the per se rule established in Albrecht.”).
245
See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that vertical maximum
price-fixing constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act); United States v. Arnold,
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Pictures,246 the Supreme Court has not addressed the appropriate
standard to be applied in television block-booking arrangements.
Because MCA illustrates the stifling effect that this decision has
had on television block-booking arrangements,247 the Supreme
Court should re-address this issue in light of post-Paramount
Pictures decisions.248 The alternative of continuing with the per se
standard would only sacrifice the benefits that some arrangements
would otherwise create.249
A. Evaluating the Television Block-Booking Arrangement under
the Rule of Reason Standard would Serve the Public Interest.
Although tying arrangements were declared illegal per se in
International Salt,250 some forty years later in Jefferson Parish251
the Court’s elaborate inquiry into a tying arrangement was
considered a full rule of reason approach.252 Although the Court
refused to reject the notion that some tying arrangements might so
stifle competition as to be illegal per se,253 the Court willingly
considered the pro-competitive effects of the hospital’s
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (holding that a supplier’s imposition of territorial
rights or franchises on the distributor was so obviously destructive of competition as to be
per se illegal) White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (determining that
too little was known about the competitive impact of a manufacturer’s assignment of
exclusive territories to its distributors to be treated as per se unlawful). But see State Oil
Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (overruling Albrecht and holding that vertical
maximum price-fixing would be evaluated under the rule of reason standard); Continental
T.V. Inc., v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling Schwinn and rejecting a
per se rule in the context of vertical nonprice restrictions).
246
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
247
MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999)
(stating that “unless and until the Supreme Court explicitly overrules [Paramount] and
[Loew’s], we must adhere to the rule they establish.”).
248
See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 31 (1984); see also
State Oil, 522 U.S. at 22.
249
See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 35 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (reasoning that “[t]he
time has therefore come to abandon the ‘per se’ label and refocus the inquiry on the
adverse economic effects, and the potential economic benefits, that the tie may have.”).
250
332 U.S. 392, 398 (1947).
251
466 U.S. at 29.
252
See Anlauf, supra note 21, at 492-93 (discussing how use of the separate demand test
in Jefferson Parish resulted in the court’s adoption of a full rule of reason standard).
253
See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 9.
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arrangement wherein the hospital tied anesthesiological services to
surgical care.254 As a result, the hospital’s defense that its tying of
services reduced costs to patients overcame the presumption of per
se illegality.255 Should the Court continue to accept defenses that a
particular arrangement promotes consumer interest under a rule of
reason analysis,256 more tying arrangements would be upheld,
including television block-booking.
Applying a consumer best interest defense to the MCA case
indicates that the Eleventh Circuit may have found the television
block-booking arrangement to have merit in that instance. The
Eleventh Circuit rejected MCA’s argument that PIC desired the
block-booking arrangement not because the arrangement was
unique but rather, because PIC had no money and MCA offered
the licenses for barter.257 The block-booking arrangement
decreased the costs to PIC as a consumer of distributor
programming.
PIC’s lack of funds suggests that there may have been no
alternative programming from other distributors. The resulting
consequence of one less independent television network at a time
when high cost cable companies were accused of monopolizing the
market258 would have reduced competition.259 Thus, had the
Eleventh Circuit considered a business justification for the blockbooking arrangement under the rule of reason as did the Supreme

254

See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 25.
See Anlauf, supra note 21, at 493 (citing Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 25 n.42).
256
See id. at n.137 (discussing how consideration of a goodwill defense is new to tying
analysis under the Sherman Act).
257
See MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1278 (11th Cir.
1999).
258
See Laura Land Sigal, Challenging The Telco-Cable Cross Ownership Ban: First
Amendment and Antitrust Implications For the Interactive Information Highway, 22
FORDAHM URB. L.J. 207, 238 (1994) (noting that “cable television remains the dominant
medium for providing consumers with multiple channels of video programming.”).
259
See id. at 239 (explaining that through ownership of the cable connection, cable
operators have control over most of the television programming channeled into a home
enabling the cable operator to easily block out competitors).
255
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Court in Jefferson Parish,260 the court would have found that the
block-booking arrangement enhanced competition in MCA.
Because the Sherman Act is meant to regulate only those
arrangements involving substantial volumes of commerce,261
whether the block-booking arrangement in MCA would have
stifled competition should be assessed beyond whether the
arrangement was in PIC’s best interest.262 Examining the
consequences of the MCA arrangement on a broad scale indicates
that the arrangement’s effects would have served the interests of all
television programming consumers, including viewers.
As noted earlier in this section, PIC’s restricted funding likely
limited the network’s ability to choose among program
distributors, even to the point that foregoing MCA’s arrangement
might have resulted in no programming at all. In light of this
limitation, the notion that television stations forced to accept
block-booking arrangements are denied access to features
marketed by other distributors263 is seriously undermined. In a
time where television viewers opting out of multi-channel
operators are already limited in their choices,264 the independent
television broadcast market needs as many competitors as
possible.265 If block-booking arrangements assist some
independent broadcasters in providing viewing alternatives in the
marketplace,266 then courts should consider the possibility of
260

See Anlauf, supra note 21, at n.137.
See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984) (citing Fortner
Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1969)).
262
See id. (stating that “[i]f only a single purchaser were ‘forced’ with respect to the
purchase of a tied item, the resultant impact on competition would not be sufficient to
warrant the concern of antitrust law.”).
263
See, e.g., United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1962).
264
See Sigal, supra note 258, at 238-39.
265
See Schurz Communications Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 982 F.2d 1043,
1051 (7th Cir. 1992)(stating that the F.C.C. sought to increase diversity in the television
marketplace when enacting the 1970 F.C.C. rules).
266
For example, one may infer that prior to MCA’s lawsuit against PIC, PIC benefited
from the block-booking arrangement; otherwise, it would not have entered into a contract
with MCA in the first place. Moreover, it may have found the arrangement desirable
because it complained only in a counterclaim to MCA’s action for breach of contract and
copyright infringement.
261
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assistance before rejecting these arrangements.267 Because only a
rule of reason standard in accordance with Jefferson Parish would
recognize a ‘best interest’ defense, the rule of reason should
become the relevant standard in television block-booking
arrangements.
C. A Rule of Reason Standard can Best Identify when Television
Block-Booking Arrangements Stimulate Interbrand
Competition, a Primary Concern of Antitrust Law.
In rejecting a per se standard for vertical maximum price-fixing,
the State Oil Court noted that the primary purpose of the Sherman
Act is to stimulate interbrand competition.268 The Court further
reasoned that maximum price-fixing, to the extent that it lowers
prices for a product,269 actually enhances competition among
suppliers.270 Moreover, the Court found that the fears271 behind
holding maximum price-fixing illegal per se272 could not be
accurately predicted in every situation.273 Because a per se
standard assumes that the effects of vertical maximum price-fixing

267

See Loew’s, 371 U.S. at 51. In Loew’s, the distributor argued that the block-booking
arrangement was a by-product of the television station’s requiring a loan in which the
guarantor required a minimum number of ads. Since the television station could not
telecast all the ads without a large number of films over which to spread the ads, a blockbooking arrangement was necessary to facilitate the transaction. Without considering the
merit of the argument, the Court rejected it because the antitrust laws cannot be avoided
by claiming a business justification. Inherent in this argument, however, is the
assumption that the arrangement restrains rather than facilitates competition.
268
See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997).
269
See id. at 7. State Oil had allegedly prevented retailers from raising prices higher than
its suggested price and collected the excess through rebates.
270
See id. at 15 (stating that “[c]utting prices in order to increase business often is the
very essence of competition”) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)).
271
See id. at 14-16 (explaining that these fears include predatory pricing, restrictions on
dealer freedom, diminished incentives for provision of services, and a mask for minimum
price setting, which is illegal per se).
272
See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 145.
273
See State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 14-16.
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are always illegal,274 the Court decided that the rule of reason
standard would identify an illegal arrangement.275
Because block-booking may increase interbrand competition
under certain circumstances, a sweeping per se rule is not
necessary. The rule of reason standard would better identify when
there is a reduction in competition. The television industry
maintains two levels of suppliers: the licensors of programming
like MCA, who supply to the broadcast networks, and the
broadcast networks who supply to television viewers.276 Thus, any
analysis as to whether interbrand competition is increased must be
evaluated at both levels.
Because block-booking ties an inferior television program to a
bundle of competitive programs,277 the distributor is able to obtain
an above market price for the lesser program.278 To the extent that
the arrangement enables the distributor to operate profitably,279 the
arrangement would ensure the presence of multiple distributors.
More distributors would translate into more leverage for networks
and less probability that a contract could be forced on a financially
challenged network such as MCA, because a distributor would
know that a network could go elsewhere.
Furthermore, where the block-booking arrangement is
exchanged on a barter basis because the scheme includes less
desirable programming,280 the block-booking arrangement has the
effect of lowering broadcast networks’ costs. This reduction in
costs could be passed on to consumers in the form of increased
programming offerings. As a result, more networks would
274

See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 165-66 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 17.
276
Schurz Communications v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 982 F.2d 1043, 1045 (7th
Cir. 1992) (reasoning that “[t]he networks can just as well be viewed as sellers of a
distribution service as they can be as buyers of programs.”).
277
See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
278
See, e.g., United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 52 (1962) (stating that any final
judgment against the block-booking program distributors must prohibit non-cost justified
differentials in price between a film when sold individually and when sold in a package).
279
See Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 159 (rejecting Columbia Pictures’ argument that
restricting block-booking would impair its ability to operate profitably).
280
See MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1268 (11th Cir.
1999).
275
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continue
to
broadcast,
thereby increasing
interbrand
competition.281 The per se standard would never include such an
in-depth analysis. Because the rule of reason would take such
benefits into account and punish block-booking arrangements that
did not stimulate interbrand competition, the rule of reason test is
best suited for the complicated circumstances of block-booking
arrangements.
D. The Rule of Reason Standard will Adequately Identify Any
Exploitation of the Copyright Monopoly because the Risk for
Misuse of the Copyright Act is Diminished in Television BlockBooking.
While the Court has stated that the assumption of market power
is still present in the instance of a television film,282 the Court has
not addressed the issue in the context of a television series.
The television industry has changed tremendously since Loew’s,
when the Supreme Court held block-booking to be illegal per se.283
At that time, just three networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC) dominated
the market by producing, exhibiting, and syndicating the
programming.284 Today there is a large market of independent
syndicators, like MCA.285 “Many syndicated programs are reruns,
broadcast by independent stations of series first shown on the
major networks.”286 While the number of small independent
networks has increased fivefold since 1970, the number of
281

See, e.g., Paddock Publ’ns Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42, 45-47 (7th Cir.
1996) (rejecting the Chicago Herald newspaper’s argument that a mixture of exclusive
contracts and other factors that endure despite short contract terms, hampers the growth
of small rivals even though each market is competitive).
282
See Loew’s, 371 U.S. at 48 (stating that “[a] copyrighted feature film does not lose its
legal or economic uniqueness because it is shown on a television rather than a movie
screen.”).
283
See id. at 50.
284
See, e.g., Schurz Communications, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 982 F.2d
1043, 1045 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining how the FCC financial interest and syndication
rules prevented ABC, NBC, and CBS from syndicating programs because they already
held too much market power).
285
See id. at 1046.
286
See id. at 1045.
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programming producers has decreased by forty percent in the last
two decades.287 That PIC, an independent network with limited
funds, could obtain a unique, first-run series through a blockbooking arrangement with a syndicated licensor, is significant.
The inherent assumption for condemning block-booking in Loew’s
was that the attachment of an inferior tied product caused the
exploitation of the copyrights on the features in the rest of the
package. Because the market of syndicating first-run series for
independent networks is slim,288 MCA’s tying of a first-run series
in a package with other first-run series could be viewed as an
equalization, not an exploitation of copyright, especially since the
majority of independent stations mainly broadcast reruns.289
Even if the ability to syndicate a program as a rerun indicates the
program’s success290 and thus would be superior to tying a first-run
series that might flop, the future success of a series is not known at
the point of licensure. Thus, any attempt to label the series as
inferior is speculative at best. The tied program in MCA, Harry,
ran for two and a half years. 291 No evidence indicated that PIC
would have stopped broadcasting Harry had MCA not sued for
copyright infringement. MCA sued and PIC cross-appealed on the
grounds of a block-booking violation only after PIC failed to pay
the cash portion of its contract.292 From the perspective of the
present-day television industry,293 Harry was a success as a firstrun series.

287

See id. at 1046.
See id.
289
Cf. Schurz Communications, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 982 F.2d 1043,
1051 (7th Cir. 1992).
290
Id. at 1045 (stating that “[v]ery few series are sufficiently successful in their initial run
to be candidates for syndication. Independent stations like to air five episodes each week
of a rerun series that originally had aired only once a week or less, so unless a series has a
first run of several years—which few series do—it will not generate enough episodes to
sustain a rerun of reasonable length.”).
291
See MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1268 (11th Cir.
1999).
292
See id. at 1268-69.
293
See, e.g., Schurz Communications, 982 F.2d at 1046 (stating that most television
entertainment programs are money losers).
288
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Given that most television programs are not money-makers,294
the measure of a program’s profitability should be distinguished
from its desirability. Where a distributor ties a feature because it is
unprofitable, the distributor is clearly exploiting the copyright of
the other features in the package.295 The risk of exploitation is
more acute in motion picture block-booking where licensing
arrangements generally provide distributors with a percentage of
gross box office profits and guaranteed minimums, regardless of
the film’s success.296 By contrast, distributors in the television
industry are generally compensated through a fixed rate of
advertising, 297 cash, or bartering.298 Thus, it is less probable that a
distributor can exploit a copyrighted work in the television
industry because capitalization and compensation are sought in the
form of advertising during program viewing.
Even where the program is undesirable from the exhibitor’s
perspective,299 acceptance of the block-booking arrangement
reflects freedom of contract more than the exploitation of
To the extent that MCA’s block-booking
copyright.300
arrangement was unattractive to PIC, it had the incentive to seek
out other program distributors.301 In this respect, the television
294

See id.
See, e.g., United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 41-43 (1962) (discussing how
research indicated that the films tied would have been sold separately for much less).
296
See Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir.
1982); but see Associated Film Distrib. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 614 F. Supp. 1100, 1103
(E.D. Pa. 1985) (stating that “[t]raditionally, terms under negotiated licenses are not firm.
If a picture bombs, the distributor may renegotiate the terms downward.”).
297
See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447 n.28 (1984) (stating
that “[t]he traditional method by which copyright owners capitalize upon the television
medium is predicated upon the assumption that compensation for the value of displaying
the works will be received in the form of advertising revenues.”).
298
See MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1268 (11th Cir.
1999).
299
See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. 417. The court should have made this distinction in MCA.
300
But see Loew’s, 371 U.S. at 47 (reasoning that “the reward does not serve its public
purpose if it is not related to the quality of the copyright. Where a high quality film
greatly desired is licensed only if an inferior one is taken, the latter borrows quality from
the former and strengthens its monopoly by drawing on the other.”).
301
See Theee Movies of Tarzan v. Pacific Theatres, Inc., 828 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir.
1987) (stating that clearances that a movie theater received from its distributor
encouraged interbrand competition by forcing competitors to find alternative subrun
movies to exhibit and promote); see also Paddock Publ’ns Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co.,
295
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block-booking arrangement stimulated competition among
distributors of television programming.302 Furthermore, even if
PIC did not have the means to pursue another program distributor
and had to accept the terms of the block-booking arrangement, this
single instance of thwarting would not be enough to impair
competition in the entire market.303 If, however, a particular
block-booking arrangement threatened a substantial volume of
commerce,304 a court could effectively safeguard these policies
under the rule of reason’s balancing approach.305
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has slowly expanded the rule of reason
standard to accommodate business arrangements formerly
relegated to per se illegality. Vertical maximum price-fixing is the
most recent of the arrangements to be set free of the per se stigma.
As MCA illustrates, courts are hesitant to extend the rule of reason
to vertical tying arrangements, at least in the television blockbooking context. However, permitting television block-booking
where it enables diverse programming and greater options for
viewers is of great importance in this age of high price, all or
nothing cable operators. The rule of reason test can adequately
punish where the greatest effect of block-booking would be an
unreasonable restraint of trade.

103 F.3d 42, 46-47 (7th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing between exclusive dealing and
exclusive distributorships and upholding the distributorship in the newspaper industry
because none of the newspapers had promised by contract to obtain all news from a
single source).
302
See Paddock Publ’ns, 103 F.3d at 47.
303
See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 18.
304
See id. at 2.
305
See id. at 40 n.10 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (reasoning that “[t]he examination
of the economic advantages of tying may properly be conducted as part of the rule of
reason analysis, rather than at the threshold of the tying inquiry.”).

